The end result should be clear, concrete, achievable tasks that are within the squad’s capabilities, not vague directives with no clear end state.ģ.
What is the center of gravity? Why does it matter? Do they know the relevant and observable metrics for success? Can they spot progress? What is the squad expected to do about security, development, governance, rule of law, and essential services in their area of operations? As Kilcullen writes, “everyone on the headquarters knows what the district’s basic problems are, but it is nobody’s day job to fix any given problem.” Actually, it is the squad’s day job: Tell them how to help. Sure, grunts lift weights, get bad tribal tattoos, and get ridiculous haircuts.
Make sure they know, specifically, what they are doing - and why. By delegating some responsibilities to competent subordinates, officers can focus on more important tasks, like working out shirtless or watching Gilmore Girls in the Command Operations Center.Ģ. They were given autonomy and, more often than not, thrived in it. Squad leaders determined their own patrol schedules, met with elders, and trained security forces. Locals looked to these extraordinary twenty-one-year-olds to solve all of their problems. With on average ten Marines and a half-dozen Afghan Army soldiers, they handled several square miles of villages, farmland, and bazaars. That means that dozens of lance corporals, corporals, and sergeants ran autonomous operations daily. Half of the squad leaders in my battalion lived on their own patrol bases. As a commander, you can delegate almost anything to a good squad leader. The Marine Corps and Army can accomplish this by rewarding initiative and cross-training critical skills. They need to be flexible, adaptable, and creative. Peter Lucier says that grunts are “highly trained technocrats.” Thus, in order to be successful - whatever success means - grunts need to do more, in fewer numbers, with less support. These days, “the military is the institution that plans, prepares for, and undertakes wars, and wars are whatever the military does,” as Rosa Brooks so aptly puts it in her book. These suggestions are informed by my experiences in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as a Marine infantry squad leader and by observing other grunts who were far better leaders than I was. I have some suggestions for how to improve the base unit of an infantry company: the thirteen-man rifle squad. Best Defense Council of the Former Enlisted